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American culture, especially in its political aspects, has always attracted foreign
observers. This was true long before we had won our unquestioned supremacy in the
modern world of finance, and, under the impact of American capitalist-political domi-
nance, that interest has been greatly intensified. Harold Laski, a British scholar, and
surely no stranger in America, now joins the ever-lengthening list of foreign commen-
tators with his flooding literary torrent, The American Democracy.1
The author's uncanny genius is famous among his American friends. It is said that
he can, on a single reading, quote verbatim long afterward an entire page or more from
books and articles, that he confidently relies on memory for volume and page references
to his source material, making the packs of index cards, so essential for the average
scholar, for him a useless encumbrance. A friend tells of the terrific speed with which
Laski dashes off articles and books. He had dined with Laski one evening and at nine
o'clock his host excused himself, saying that he must prepare an article for The New
Republic. An hour later he appeared and handed his guest a sealed envelope containing
the finished manuscript with the request that he post it on his way home.
This book comes pretty close td being the result of Laski's life work. In wordage it
has the epic proportions of a magnum opus. Certain reviewers rate it as Laski's "big
book"; 2 others are less certain.3 Only time can determine its true stature and usefulness,
its significance for our future.
The book has been in specific contemplation only since 1937, but materials have been
accumulating since 1916 when the author joined the Harvard faculty. "I realized," Laski
says of this initial American engagement, "that, as a European, I had entered upon an
experience wholly different in character from anything I had known.' 4 During more or
less prolonged periods throughout the intervening years, he has been in America as visitor,
lecturer, and teacher at various institutions, including (besides Harvard) Yale, the Uni-
versity of Chicago, and the University of Washington. Laski settled down among us,
made innumerable friends, and got the "feel" of American life in different sections of
the country, When he was not on American soil, close friends, such as Felix Frankfurter,
kept him abreast of our affairs. Certainly no other foreign commentator has had such
opportunities to study the vast subject of which he writes, not even de Tocqueville or
Bryce-the immortals with whom Mr. Laski's publishers firmly place their author.
Their confidence in rating Laski's volume with the French aristocrat's classic, Democ-
racy in America (1838) and Bryce's "great work," The American Commonwealth (i888)
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challenges our inquiry. There are in fact points of similarity as well as of difference.
All three books are works of great mass and sweep, touching nearly every aspect of our
culture. All three are by writers of acknowledged learning and established repute. Here,
however, similarity seems to end.
De Tocqueville brought to his work a philosophic cast of mind coupled with rare
discernment and a polished literary style. As an aristocrat he naturally entertained certain
social predilections, haunting doubts about democracy, though he seldom let them show
through. The Frenchman came to America wanting to know profoundly about democ-
racy, to probe its character, appraise its standing, and evaluate its future, not only in
America but in the world. "I confess that in America," he wrote, "I saw more than
America; I sought there the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character,
its prejudices and its passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its
progress."5
De Tocqueville, like Laski, had the advantage of writing during a period of swift
transition: the former in the heyday of Jacksonian democracy, the latter as Roosevelt's
New Deal was at its peak. To study a society during such surging times is an advantage
because then a people's character and institutions reflect their most vivid hues, and reveal
their most striking qualities. De Tocqueville's work gained in full measure from this,
while a similar fortuitous circumstance in the case of Laski seems to have been less reward-
ing. In the 183o's de Tocqueville saw America, like France, truly in the throes of revolu-
tion. This may explain why he successfully portrayed our political tradition in all its
manifold complexity. Laski prefers to minimize the changes that took place in our
1930's, considering as he does that what happened under Franklin D. Roosevelt was "in
no sense a revolution."" Yet here, as elsewhere, he unites richly detailed knowledge and
acute observation with dogged adherence to the deterministic theory of history.
De Tocqueville saw America embarked on political experimentation attended by risk
of failure but with a reasonably good chance of success. Danger had to be faced from
all sides. He cited the mob passion for mere change, on the one hand, and, on the
other, the stubborn refusal of privilege "to move altogether for fear of being moved too
far." For him both attitudes were destructive of any orderly progress. De Tocqueville
was certain that America would have to reckon with blind change as well as with blind
opposition to change. But what impressed him most was our equalitarian drive for "the
progressive elimination of privilege and inequality"--"the great gravitational principle of
the future," he called it. On the basis of his findings over here, de Tocqueville concluded
that democracy was neither "a brilliant and easily realized dream," nor was it to be
identified with "destruction, anarchy, spoliation and murder."
"I have attempted to show," he writes, "that the government of a democracy may be
reconciled with respect for property, with deference for rights, with safety for freedom,
with reverence for religion. . ."
Mr. Laski's pages are decidedly less reassuring. America, he holds, is now faced with
hard and narrow alternatives. We must either voluntarily democratize industry, destroy
capitalist dominance, or be faced with a mass protest that can be neither appeased nor
suppressed. Laski views our "historic American tradition, for all its great achievements"
with "uncertainty and e4,en suspicion." "Americans have refused to ask themselves," he
suggests, "whether the historic principles of their tradition can be adapted to the environ-
ment of a new time.... And, to the outsider, that refusal to inquire was something it was
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hard not to connect with the character of the answers they were suspicious they might
receive. For they were deeply aware not only of the increasing tensions of our society;
even more, they were aware that when, in a period of crisis, increasing tensions demand
new formulas, we must move from one set of social ideals to another set, and adapt to the
claims of these the form of economic and political organization which is proving obsolete,
and even dangerous."8
And later on Laski says: "... it is hardly possible, on the evidence, not to feel that the
impersonal forces of the world are shaping American destiny in a democratic direction
which no party can deny and yet survive. Here is the real promise of American life" 0-
i.e., in vital response to world forces.
The Scottish Bryce lacked the philosophic bent as well as the literary facility of
both de Tocqueville and Laski. A profound student of comparative political institutions,
Bryce necessarily employed a descriptive and analytical method. He thought of his
task as that of exposition rather than interpretation or judgment. Bryce wanted to know
what kind of government the English had developed in America. A man of affairs and
statecraft as well as an accomplished observer, he gave significance to American institu-
tions by placing them in their comparative setting. The result is a book which Woodrow
Wilson lauded, in his famous review of March, 1889, as "exact," "passionless," "discrimi-
nating and scientific."'1
Bryce, even more than de Tocqueville, shies away from prophecy. In words that
contrast strikingly with Laski's almost categorical certainty of what the future holds,
Bryce cautiously observes: "No one doubts that fifty years hence [America] will differ at
least as much from what it is now as it differs now from the America which Tocque-
ville described.""
One sees in Laski's book something of the comparative approach that so plainly marks
The American Commonwealth. .But whereas Bryce was wont to set specific American
habits and institutions off against those of his own countrymen, Laski has before him
the "massive" figure of Karl Marx. "The simple fact is," Laski observes in an aside, "that
the American educational system reflects the character of the economic system within
which it functions. . . . One could no more expect a capitalist society to permit its
teachers generally to undermine the foundations of private property than one could expect
the schools and universities of the Soviet Union to admit teachers whose energies are
devoted to expounding the fallacies of Marxism ....12
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Students of politics are well aware that liberty is never so complete (even in America)
as not, on occasion, to be subjected to the arbitrary control of government or of organized
groups or of mass preferences and prejudices. Nor is authority ever so complete (even
in Soviet Russia) as to allow no individual freedom whatsoever. Nevertheless, Laski's
rather easy equating of such academic freedom as we more or less have in America with
the arbitrary political control generally exercised over individuals by the Soviet police
state scarcely warrants the encomiums Wilson bestowed on Bryce's work as "thorough,"
"exact," "passionless.' 13
In spite of certain rather obvious predilections, Laski, being active in both academic
and practical affairs in his own country, and occasionally enjoying the advantage of an
insider in American politics, does give his book that "air of practical sense" which per-
vades Bryce's pages. Yet an important difference should be noted. Bryce's coolly factual
exposition, though illuminated throughout by acute observation and suggestion, is almost
completely devoid of any unifying theme or working hypothesis. Laski's materials, in
sharp contrast with both de Tocqueville and Bryce, converge into a passionate, dynamic
thesis. It appears, at times, almost as if Laski had settled on his conclusions at the outset
and then selected from books, monographs, conversations, and his own observation the
evidence necessary to sustain these conclusions. This, more than anything else, is what
distinguishes his volume from the works of both de Tocqueville and Bryce. Nor is it
unexpected.
Laski's political point of view, his way of handling public issues, his specific interpre-
tation of institutions-all are well known. The American Democracy-had to be, as the
publishers say, "an examination of America from a socialist, non-communist point of
view." One can only regret that the standpoint is so insufficiently integrated.. The book
manifests a split personality, combining the precision of the scholar with the sweeping
generalization of the pamphleteer. The chapter on Minority Problems apart, this tends to
be true whether the topic discussed is education, business enterprise, religion, or foreign
affairs. Consider his treatment of education: Few Americans (not even Jacques Barzun in
his notable Teacher in America (945)) have exposed more dearly the plethora of uni-
versity administration, its want of any unifying policy, its wasteful stress on devices, its
blindness to the vital role of the teacher. But certain academicians may be inclined to
question such statements as this: "There have been few colleges which did not assume
that the character of their training should be ultimately controlled by the successful
businessman.14
Members of the academic community know, or think they know, that the really influ-
ential teachers are not those who day in and day out hymn hosannas to Free Enterprise,
but rather those on whom Laski himself draws, scholars who have freely queried -the
sanctity of "the American way," men who know that "if we are to guide by the light of
reason we must let our minds be bold." Academicians and others may be able to cite
quite a number of institutions where such teachers are not muzzled by wealthy industrial-
ist-banker trustees, as Laski would seem to imply. But these academic oases should not
close our eyes to obsequious hints such as those in the bronze plaque in Kirby Hall at
Lafayette College, which has proclaimed for over twenty years: ,
This Hall of Civil Rights is the gift of Fred Morgan Kirby to provide facilities
for instruction in the Anglo-Saxon ideals of the true principles of constitutional
freedom including the right of a man to own property and do with it as he will....
Laski's basic principle is set forth at the very beginning in two interchangeably
See note io supra.
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repetitious chapters. Tffe Marxian truism, quoted more than once, that "the ruling ideas
of an age are the ideas of the ruling class" gives the theme of the book. America's ruling
class is, of course, the businessmen. "There has never, as yet, been a time," Laski tells us,
"when the character of the American state power has been shaped by philosophy which
the owning class has not been able to define."'15  The philosophy of American business
not only determines the ideological context within which the teacher must operate, but
also supplies "an ideal to which [the churches] have lent the immense prestige they
possess."' 6 The businessman's interests and ideas, Laski insists, are about equally con-
trolling in radio, cinema, and in shaping the course of our foreign policy. And so runs
the Marxist refrain through long, richly rewarding chapters, full of detail, keen analysis,
and biting epigram.
The severity of Laski's indictment of the "owning class" for our failure to fulfill the
hopes implicit in the Declaration of Independence rests, in part, on his unwarranted
assumption that our tradition was initially democratic. Except under the temporary
political enthusiasms generated by the impending revolutionary struggle against Britain,
our tradition has never been wholly democratic. Certain "defects" in the institutions
born of democratic fervor after 1776, especially the state constitutions and the Articles of
Confederation, were explained in terms of "unexperience" by men holding views as
widely divergent as those of Jefferson and Hamilton. Within a few years after the
breaking off from the mother country Jefferson disparaged the "unexperience in the
science of government" which he saw reflected in the first constitution of Virginia. About
the same time (1782) Hamilton spoke of the "very vague and confined notions of the
practical business of government" with which the colonists had begun the Revolution.
Hamilton reverted to the same theme in The Federalist, Number 26, saying that "it was
hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that
happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between Power and Privilege, and com-
bines the energy of government with the security of private rights."'' l "The science of
politics," Hamilton had said in The Federalist, Number 9, "like most other sciences,
has received great improvements."' 8  Madison likewise believed that new political dis-
coveries made it possible, as he put it in The Federalist, Number io, "to secure the public
good and private rights and at the sarfie time preserve the spirit and form of popular
government."' 9
The advances Hamilton et al. had in mind took the form of constitutional axioms and
devices whereby popular power, so unequivocally sanctioned in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, could be harnessed, checked, and divided to the end that encroachments on
individual liberty and, above all, on the rights of property might be prevented. Indeed,
if there was any point on which the Founding Fathers were agreed it was that stated by
Elbridge Gerry on the floor of the Philadephia Convention: 'The evils we experience
flow from the excess of democracy."0
"Democracy," Charles A. Beard wrote in 1943, "still carried such a dangerous or
dubious flavor that it was not used at all in the Declaration of Independence, or in any
of the great state papers of the Revolution or in any of the first state constitutions. It
did not appear in the Constitution of the United States." 2' Beard goes so far as to say
' OP. 52. o p. 322.
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that democracy was not appropriate as describing the dominant characteristic, name, or
symbol of our political and social faith until Woodrow Wilson and World War I. But
despite such repugnance or scant recognition, Beard concedes that "the actual law of the
land has been moving in the democratic direction." 22
With his customary brilliance, Laski does full justice to the powerful role played by
property in the drama of our culture. He does less than justice, I think, to the effective
idealism persistent in our various reformist movements and given timeless expression in
the Declaration of Independence. 23 He accords insufficient attention to the substantial
achievements of the peculiarly American passion that caught de Tocqueville's discerning
eye-our inexhaustible urge for equality. Laski is impressed, and rightly so, by the fact
that this revolutionary principle based on human rights and the popular power flowing
therefrom has been constantly confronted by the counter-revolutionary principle based on
rights of property.24 He is almost fatally discouraged as he observes how our persistent
effort to consolidate and extend the gains implicit in the American revolution has been
stubbornly challenged, frustrated, and, on occasion, defeated. He may do his readers a
disservice in obscuring the more vital fact noted by Beard--that vested interests, by and
large, have fought a losing battle, that we have been, and are now, moving in the demo-
cratic direction. Progress has been slow but steady.
Though the Founding Fathers feared democracy and despised the mob, they did not
dare repulse every democratic aspiration. In all great American debates where the isue
of human rights versus property rights has been squarely posed, the claims of democracy,
of human rights, have been upheld by able champions. When Hamilton and Madison
advocated, in the Philadephia Convention of X787, separate and independent representa-
tion for property and constitutional devices to hamper popular power, George Mason,
while admitting that "we had been too democratic," called an abrupt halt lest we
"incautiously run into the opposite extreme." "Notwithstanding the oppression and
injustice experienced among us from democracy," Mason warned, "the genius of the
people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted. ' ' 2 ' The result
was that every proposal for fixing property as a basis of voting or office holding was de-
feated and this whole troublesome business left to the states to be dealt with as they saw
fit. Here certainly was a time when American national power was shaped by a philoso-
phy which the owning class was not able to define. Property qualifications of all sorts
were voted down not because the "owning class" did not favor such expedients but
"because they saw no prospect of getting them accepted" 28
A generation later various state conventions were called to level constitutional barriers
which the early state constitutions had thrown around property as safeguards against
popular power. As in the Federal Convention, existing constitutional barricades were
strongly defended and justified by some of the ablest men in the country, including
Chancellor James Kent in New York, Abel Upshur and John Randolph in Virginia, and
Daniel Webster in Massachusetts. But their efforts were unavailing against the argu-
^
2 Id. at 34.
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starry-eyed, forever ringing in his ears. To forget them, to act against their hope and faith in men, is
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cannot drown."
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ments of men less eminent, but more persuasive. "The tendency of universal suffrage,"
Kent had argued, "is to jeopardize the rights of property and the principles of liberty." 7
In a telling argument an obscure Mr. Cramer retorted: "Men . . . in defense of their
liberties, and to protect the property of this country, have hazarded their lives. They
could, without apprehension, be permitted to handle their muskets, bayonets, powder
and balls; but, say the gentlemen (Kent) it will not be safe to trust them with tickets at
the ballot boxes."'28 Cramer's argument won; universal manhood suffrage was soon
achieved. Again the character of state power was shaped by a philosophy which the
"owning class" was "not ... able to define." Privilege found other and more subtle ways,
it is true, of safeguarding its interests, but unconquerable idealism has continued to battle
and to advance, despite the most stubborn resistance of privilege.
The victory has not been fully achieved by any means, but our idealism, our faith
in the power of reason to get a hearing and thus shape human destiny, remains undi-
minished.29 It was this clear vision of the good life to be won according to blueprints
fashioned by reason (not by "large and impersonal forces") that imparted so much un-
conquerable voltage to Roosevet's New Deal. Electoral acceptance of Roosevelt's reform
program in 1932, in 1936, in 194o, and finally in 1944 embodied and empowered changes
of extraordinary significance as to the theory of the relation of government to the main-
tenance of our system of private profit and free enterprise. New Deal successes are
revolutionary not in undermining or destroying this system, but as marking a break with
the longest and deepest line in that aspect of the American tradition which Mr. Laski so
heavily underscores--"rugged individualism"-the tradition which looked upon the
government with "doubt and suspicion,"30 the dogma that identifies individualism with
laissez faire and considers liberty as possible only in a society relatively free from state
regulation and control. Against all this is the New Deal doctrine that under the cqm-
plexities of industrialism, of highly organized group interests and sterile, self-defeating
conflicts, liberty is possible only if government, and not industrial management or owner-
ship, is the dominant though not the absolute power. New Dealers recognized that under
conditions so vastly changed since 1850, our government could no longer be confined to
narrow bounds of "defense and order,"31 that freedom is the great aim of the state-
freedom to be won by the positive acts of government. Mr. Laski himself suggests a
certain measure of the changes thus wrought when he. concedes that "Roosevelt's policies
"T REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED FOR THE
PURPosE OF AMENDING THE CONSnrTUON OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 221 (1821).
" Id. at 239.
"The following from William Allen White's autobiography illustrates the spirit that has pervaded
our history:
"Looking back now more than thirty years, I can shut my eyes and see that Bull Moose convention
of 1912, see their eager faces-more than a thousand of them-upturned, smiling hopefully, with joy
beaming out that came from hearts which believed in what they were doing; its importance, its righteous-
ness.
"It seemed to matter so very much, that convention of zealots, cleansed of self-interest and purged of
cynicism. I never have seen before or since exactly that kind of a crowd. I impressed it on my memory
because I felt as they felt-those upturned, happy faces.
"And now they are dust, and all the visions they saw that day have dissolved. Their hopes, like
shifting clouds, have blown away before the winds of circumstance. And I wonder if it did matter
much. Or is there somewhere, in the stuff thit holds humanity together, some force, some conservation
of spiritual energy, that saves the core of every noble hope, and gathers all men's visions some day,
some way, into the reality of progress?
"I do not know. But I have seen the world move, under some, maybe mystic, influence, far enough
to have the right to ask that question." THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY o; WILLIAM ALLEN WHIT 627 (1946).
3 P. 7. "1 Ibid.
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gave a direction to the economic life of America from which it will be very difficult for
his opponents to go back."'32 The 1948 presidential election seems to bear this out.
It is hard to discover precisely what the I93O's mean to Mr. Laski. On page 36, he
tells us that under F.D.R. "property was everywhere on the defensive." On page 81, he
recognizes that "President Franklin Roosevelt brought into being the positive federal
state." Of the period after 1933, he writes: "The era of the positive state had arrived in
America as decisively as in Europe; and with the arrival of the positive state there was no
room for negativism in the White House any more than in Downing Street or in the
Kremlin. '3 3 For a culture so completely under the dominance of businessmen as Laski
repeatedly says it is, for a tradition in essence individualistic, always tending, as he cor-
rectly observes, to look upon the state as at best a necessary evil, Roosevelt's achieve-
ments appear, on the author's own showing, hardly short of revolutionary.
Nor do I think it quite fair to say, as does Mr. Laski, that President Roosevelt was
"driven on by large and impersonal forces which he rarely stayed to examine."3 4  Mr.
Roosevelt, beginning with his famous campaign speech at the Commonwealth Club,
September 23, 1932, stated emphatically and repeatedly the far-reaching significance of
the policies he then advocated and later, when in office, got enacted into law. On January
I1, 1944, he formulated a new Bill of Economic Rights. These new goals he knew would
have to be realized not by "large and impersonal forces" but by considered acts of govern-
ment. He saw all along what Mr. Laski's book makes so clear-that our so-called free
enterprise suffers chiefly from self-inflicted wounds, that the most serious inroads on
the integrity of our economic system have been made by overweening economic power,
and that government would have to safeguard society against such power 35
Mr. Laski is able, as we have seen, to think of the transformation that took place
under President Roosevel's leadership as "in no sense a revolution," but his opponents
never could do so. They saw government control of their power cartels as "overthrowing
the very fundamentals of our country's tradition." One measure of the changes Roosevelt
wrought is the extraordinary lengths to which the opposition went then and is now
prepared to go in order to block the regulatory power of government. It is all too evident
now that to forestall any repetition of New Dealism, economic privilege will strike at
the jugular vein of popular government, i.e., at freedom of thought and speech. "I do not
believe," Robert S. Lynd writes in a recent article, "that business intends to allow another
New Deal, with its free-wheeling populism, to happen."3 6 Industrial management now
seeks, Lynd says, to infiltrate opinion-making bodies--schools, churches, women's dubs,
etc.-at the grass roots. Any future New Dealism might conceivably be nipped in the
bud by controlling the very processes of democracy through such enactments as the
Mundt-Nixon bill. This measure is only one sign among many pointing us toward
the hard alternative Laski so fatalistically foresees--"to fulfill the democratic ideal or
... wholly to deny it.'
3 7
Mr. Laski's book does the reader its greatest service in confronting him sharply with
the question whether a political system characterized, as ours is, by ambiguity, by balance
and tension between public power and private rights, can survive in the present world.
It has been possible previously, Laski suggests, to maintain the always perilous, always lop-
sided balance Madison envisaged, because Americans generally, regardless of status, believed
" P. 182. 33 P. 77- 3 P. 8I.
85 See especially F. D. R.'s campaign speech, Oct. 14, 1936, when he argued that "It was this admin-
istration which saved the system of private profit and free enterprise." V THE PtmLIC PAPERS AND
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so tenaciously that this system was basic to their freedom. This is no longer true, Laski
thinks, because Americans in ever-growing numbers know that the balance has in fact been
broken; that the much vaunted free-enterprise system, since about 187o, has been in
process of destruction by concentrated economic power. And so the prospect Americans
could formerly entertain of becoming independent in their own shop or trade, or on their
own land, has dimmed. From now on protection of so-called free enterprise from
"radicals" is not, Laski contends, likely to impress the average American as urgent or
essential to his freedom. The conclusion is that the American political tradition, once
unique, cannot remain so, not only because of impersonal forces at work within our own
community but also because of cosmic economic and social factors beyond our borders.
".. . the peculiar complex of qualities we call Americanism," Laski observes, "is now
subject to much the same forces as the peculiar complex we call European." 38
Laski, in short, maintains that traditional Americanism is outmoded. If the United
States of America is to fulfill the democratic hopes expressed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the paralyzing grip of economic power must be completely broken. "Ameri-
canism must come to mean the same thing for the sharecropper of Arkansas as for the
stockbroker on Park Avenue in New York City, for the steel worker in Pittsburgh as for
the corporation lawyer in Wall Street ... ',9 This would be a revolutionl
It will not be easy, Laski admits. Lenin, he reminds us, was able to cut "the Gordian
knot of passionate disagreement upon first principles by embarking upon a violent revolu-
tion . . .," The task in America will be greater, Laski thinks, because (among other
reasons) the bourgeoisie has a firmer hold and much more at stake. But the effort must
be made, because "any interventionism [government] which seeks to maintain at once
private ownership in the means of production, adequate living conditions for the masses,
the power to make profit in national and international competition, and to use the State
power as a neutral authority standing, without bias, between contending parties in the
intricate, often antagonistic, complex of relationships in the modern community, is doomed
to fail.'"4'
Does the course of history dictate any such inevitable fate? Machiavelli says, "Fate
is inevitable only if not resisted." To declare that America must go one way or else, one
must read into our tradition, as Laski does, the deterministic monism of Karl Marx. One
must minimize the fact, as Laski sometimes does, that our politics, for better or worse, is
dualistic in foundation and in development. On the economic side, we recognize prop-
erty as the basis of power and right; on the political side, we make numbers the basis
of power and right. Throughout our history these two have been in competition and
conflict. Our tradition has sustained class conflicts amounting at times to civil war; but
is it likely that class lines will be frozen, as Laski seems to believe, to such a point that
overlapping interests completely disappear? 42 Does the fine fruit of our'tradtion consist,
as Mr. Laski seems to think, in unrestrained dominance of the political over the economic,
in substitution of the dominance of labor for the dominance of capital? Is the effort
"P. 756. "P. 760.
4 0P. 760-76i. P. 754-755.
42 "The argument, drawn from history," John Dewey observes, "that great social changes have been
effected only by violent means, needs considerable qualification, in view of the vast scope of changes
that are taking place without the use of violence. But even if it be admitted to hold of the past, the
conclusion that violence is the method now to be depended upon does not follow-unless one is com-
mitted to a dogmatic philosophy of history. The radical who insists that the future method of change
must be like that of the past has much in common with the hide-bound reactionary who holds to the
past as an ultimate fact. Both overlook the fact that history in being a process of change generates
change not only in details but also in the method of directing social change." Jon DEwEY, LUERALXSM
AN SOCIAL Acsor; 82-83 (1935).
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to hold level tension between the two, and to maintain a continually balanced relationship
between the various interests within society, inevitably doomed to failure? At one point
Laski himself seems to lean toward a negative answer:
Americanism is multiform, and it is also, at its very roots, nonconformist.
No one can fully shape it the way he wants it to go-no president and no million-
aire, no labour leader and no intellectual; and it is not even shaped by all the
objective consequences of its mass production system. Something is always escaping
to be itself; something is always emerging to protest that things must be done
another way; there is always an ardent clash between traditionalist and reformer
which makes the consequential Americanism different from what either of them
dared both to hope and to fear 4 3
Laski has similar insights elsewhere, only to lapse now and again into the attitude
which Edmund Burke attributed to the French revolutionists: "Liberty is always to be
estimated as perfect as property is rendered insecure."
44
Laski writes in the iconoclastic literary tradition of J. Allen Smith, Vernon A. Par-
rington, and Charles A. Beard (unrevised) without giving the reader the sense of ad-
venture and discovery that made these writers exciting in their day. To regrind the
academic grist of a generation or more ago is not calculated to yield a wholly satisfactory
analysis of the living present. The reader's confidence is further shaken by slips of memory,
as on page 78 where Burton K. Wheeler, Progressive Party candidate for vice-president
of the United States with Robert M. LaFollette in 1924, is referred to as "Democratic
candidate for the Vice-Presidency"; by confusion of sources, as on page 252, where the
seasoned words of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., written in 1871, are erroneously credited
to twenty-three-year-old Brooks Adams. Laski then ties it all up neatly with what Brooks
Adams really wrote "thirty years later," actually in 1913.
The American Democracy suffers from the author's truly extraordinary gifts-his
unusual memory, his great literary talent. One ventures to suggest that in this instance
if Laski had spent less time in writing and more in cutting and revising, the volume
would have exhibited in greater degree the sort of close reasoning which readers of his
earlier works expect.
In a book so eminently worth while, one hesitates to elaborate stylistic defects-
unconscionable wordage, tiresome repetition of pet ideas, illustrations, literary allusions,
and phrases-all faintly reminiscent of an old phonograph record monotonously spinning
along its grooves. (Among others, Mr. Laski seems over-addicted to the word "massive.")
Without being a great work, in a class with de Tocqueville or Bryce, Laski's com-
mentary is, nevertheless, a sociological document no student of American politics can
afford to ignore. His alert eye and inquiring mind have scanned our banalities, our
foibles, our idiosyncrasies and defects, as well as our more seemly qualities and enduring
achievements. What is more, scattered through the book are passages in which he puts
what he sees in matchless prose. As a friendly, devastating critic, Laski surpasses G.
Lowes Dickinson at his best. His analysis of certain American personalities, such as Henry
Luce and H. L. Mencken, is at times merciless, the more so because it so often squarely
hits the mark. Can anyone, after reading what Laski writes about, say, Time magazine
or the Reader's Digest, allow himself to be caught with either of these fabulously popu-
lar periodicals in hand without a sense of apology, of shame?
In his earlier writings our author noted the unsettling effect of the French revolution
"A p. 719 •
"Enmurr) BuRxE, REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 43 (Maynard's English Classic Series,
Nos. 16o-x6i).
404 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
on Edmund Burke. Have the Russian upheavals since 1917 wrought similar havoc in
Harold Laski? Burke's brooding fears of the cosmic force of events in France after 79o
blunted his shrewd sense of history, impaired his customary mastery of facts, moving him
to pour out irresponsible rhetoric in his Reflections on the French Revolution. Burke's
passionate concern to preserve monarchy, church, and nobility against change drove him,
as Thomas Paine once remarked, "to pity the plumage and forget the dying bird," per-
mitting him to pass over the well-nigh inexhaustible potentialities of the French revolution
in terms of human freedom and social betterment. Likewise, Laski, in revolt against
Czarist evils, enamoured of the Soviet Union's "massive" economic and social achieve-
ments, appears at times to be carried away by the "equal opportunities for self-advance-
ment" he envisages for the individual in the Soviet state. But are not all such proclama-
tions of equality, etc., appealing as they are in terms of man's spiritual aspirations and
economic needs, merely "rhetorical fig-leaves" that cannot hide the naked fact, seen by
President Roosevelt, February io, 1940
, 
that "the Soviet Union is run by a dictatorship as
absolute as any other in the world"? 45 In any event, Laski seems now to have lost some-
thing of that breadth of vision, that incisiveness of mind, which earlier gave promise of
winning for him a place in political philosophy alongside John Stuart Mill.
This is not, however, to minimize Laski's constructive service as the most penetrating
critic of capitalist democracy in our time. It is rather to suggest that his greatest contribu-
tions have been made at a more practical, less academic level. The American Democracy,
like all Laski's writings of more recent years, contains materials of special value for those
least likely to pay him heed-the short-sighted businessman, full of power and swagger,
obtuse no less to the general interest than to his own. Laski does for the American "man
of property" a service equal at least to that rendered by Galsworthy to his English counter-
part. This book may not find its main target; but for that, as already suggested, the
author himself must share the blame.
" Laski does himself a disservice in this book in not making it perfectly clear that he is under no
illusions about the Soviet Union's "democracy," as he has done in the columns of The Nation and
elsewhere. See especially his articles, Why Does Russia Act That Way, x64 TuE NArmot 239 (1947),
and Getting On With Russia, x66 THE NA'roN 34 (1948).
